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Abstract 
We present the application of network theory to the Dutch payment system with specific attention to 
systemic stability. The network nodes comprise of domestic banks, large international banks and 
TARGET countries, the links are established by payments between the nodes. Traditional measures 
(transactions, values) first show payments are relatively well behaved through time and that the system 
does not contain a group of significant structural net receivers or payers among the participant 
institutions. Structural circular flows do, however, exist in the system, most prominently a large 
circular net flow between TARGET countries. Analysis of the properties of prominent network 
measures over time shows that fast network development takes place in the early phase of network 
formation of about one hour and slower development afterwards. The payment network is small (in 
actual nodes and links), compact (in path length and eccentricity) and sparse (in connectivity) for all 
time periods. In the long run, a mere 12% of the possible number of interbank connections is ever used 
and banks are on average only 2 steps apart. Relations in the network tend to be reciprocal. Our results 
also indicate that the network is susceptible to directed attacks. In a final section we show that the 
recent ‘sub prime’ turmoil in credit markets has not materially affected the network structure. 
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INTRODUCTION 
From the late 1990s the study of the topological structure of random networks has gained momentum. 
Empirical observations from large and rapidly evolving networks like the World Wide Web (Albert 
(1999)), the Internet (Faloutsos, et al. (1999)), and journal publishing economists (Goyal, et al. (2006)) 
brought to light a surprising compactness (‘small world phenomenon’) and relatively many highly 
connected networks elements (Dorogovtsev and Mendes (2003)). These findings have shifted attention 
away from classical, static networks (Erdõs and Rényi (1959)) towards growing networks.1 An 
important property of the latter is their robustness against random failures. At the same time, however, 
they are vulnerable against directed attacks (Albert, et al. (1999)).  
The ideas of network theory can be applied to the field of economics, for example to study the risk of 
widespread propagation of financial distress (systemic risk). There is a vast literature analysing the 
interactions of various financial markets such as equity and bond markets.2 A small but growing 
literature examines the riskiness of interbank markets, where banks exchange relatively short term and 
largely unsecured funds.3 These papers, however, do not focus on the network topology of the 
markets. Inaoka, et al. (2004) and Soramäki, et al. (2007) have started to describe large value financial 
payment systems (in Japan and the US, respectively) from a network perspective. Another example is 
Bech and Garrat (2006) which analyses the effects of a wide-scale disruption on the functioning of the 
interbank payment system. Our paper builds on this literature, and adds to it by illustrating (1) the 
influence of the chosen time frame on the properties of the payment network, (2) the central role of 
highly connected banks in the functioning of the payment network and (3) The existence of large 
circular net payment flows domestically and between TARGET countries.  
Importantly, in contrast to for instance analyses of interbank exposures (e.g. Boss, et al. (2004) or van 
Lelyveld and Liedorp (2006)), payments networks are by definition short lived: as soon as the 
payment is settled, the visible, recorded connection between banks disappears. As we analyse and 
discuss in more detail in (Pröpper, et al. (2007)), this affects our understanding of what constitutes a 
network. Here we show that the time frame used to compute the network measures materially affects 
the outcomes. A proper understanding of the evolution of the network is important from a risk 
management perspective. Ultimately, the purpose is to get an understanding of the level of stability or, 
alternatively, vulnerability of the system to random or directed failures and to systemic risk.  
                                               
1
 The former, equilibrium random networks, have Poisson degree distributions (the degree of a node is the 
number of its links). The latter, non-equilibrium random networks, may under the right conditions result in fat-
tailed, scale-free degree distributions close to a power law. This is the case when they are governed by (a linear 
kind of) preferential attachment which means that new network elements are more likely to attach themselves to 
elements that are already highly connected (Barabási and Albert (1999)). 
2
 See Pericoli and Sbracia (2003) for an overview. 
3
 See Allen and Gale (2000) for a theoretical characterisation of these markets and van Lelyveld and Liedorp 
(2006) and the references therein for an empirical analysis. The general finding is that interbank markets are 
from a systemic stability point of view relatively safe.  
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Network theory equips us with promising tools. The questions we will answer are tackled by first 
studying the (time development of) network structure of the payment system in terms of commonly 
used network properties like the size of the payment network, the connectivity between banks, 
distances in the network, the distributions of connections between banks and network correlations This 
for example allows us to take a first, indirect peek at the risks that the system faces, by assessing the 
importance to the network of the most highly connected banks. In addition, we present results of the 
impact on the payment network of the sub prime crisis (in 2007) which caused worldwide turmoil on 
financial markets. 
The set-up of our paper is straightforward. We start with a short description of the institutional detail 
of the Dutch large value payment system (TOP), the technical details of the data set and an 
international comparison of aggregate key figures. Next, we discuss the intraday behaviour of the 
system. Then we investigate whether there are structural imbalances (between individual –or groups 
of– participants) in the system. After this examination of the basic properties of our data we examine 
the build up of the network over time. First we analyse the development over time of commonly used 
network measures in the literature. Second, we analyse the vulnerability, or, alternatively formulated, 
systemic stability, of the system. We report the impact on the network structure and on the key system 
figures of removing the ten most highly connected participants in the data set. In addition, we analyse 
whether the recent ‘sub prime’ crisis in credit markets has affected the network properties of the 
payment system. We end with the conclusions. 
THE DUTCH PAYMENT SYSTEM 
Since 1999 the Dutch large value payment system (TOP) is part of the European system for euro-
denominated payments, TARGET.4 TOP is restricted to a limited set of participants, mainly banks. 
Connections to participants in other TARGET countries takes place through TARGET.5  
For the system to function properly it is essential that participants have sufficient funds so that 
payments can be made without delay. Intraday credit provided by DNB (secured by collateral) 
facilitates a smooth functioning of the payment system and prevents gridlock. 6 In the Netherlands, 
commercial banks permanently hold (pledged) collateral at the central bank, generally at a relatively 
stable level during the year.7 
                                               
4
 Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer system. 
5
 By the end of 2007, TARGET will be replaced by TARGET2, which is a single shared platform. All local 
systems, including TOP, will then migrate to TARGET2 in three phases. Technically, the latter is a centralised 
system, but legally it is a decentralised system in which each country designates its own component system. 
6
 See Ledrut (2006) for a discussion of the optimal provision of intraday liquidity. 
7
 In addition to maintaining a collateral pool, it is possible to place collateral through repo transactions. When the 
credit balance becomes insufficient, collateral is brought in and the balance is raised, usually in the morning. At 
the end of the day, the transaction is reversed. 
 3 
Regular opening hours are from 7h until 18h and during these hours the payment system processes all 
transaction types. In addition, there is an evening settlement period from 19:30h to 22h, which is used 
for settling ancillary system batches and not for standard domestic transactions and cross border 
(TARGET) payments. Incidentally, the latter two types of transactions make up for more than 80% of 
the value transferred (Oord and Lin (2005)). 
We analyse a data set consisting of one year of transaction data from the Dutch large value payment 
system, running from June 2005 to May 2006 (257 business days).8 Transactions carried out during 
evening settlement are generally excluded, except for calculations of net value transfer. No standard 
domestic, domestic correspondent bank and cross border transactions through TARGET are carried 
out during evening settlement. We use the settlement time rather than the moment a transaction is 
entered into the system in our analysis. Participants with more than one account are consolidated. 
Payments between two accounts of a single participant are therefore not included in the analysis. Also, 
due to the limitations of the dataset, cross border transactions are not analysed on a participant, but on 
a country level. In short, we analyse a network of participants, not of accounts, and some participants 
are countries rather than banks. 
Table 1 shows daily averages on numbers of participants, transaction volumes, values transferred and 
(average) transaction values for the Top (NL), TARGET (EU), CHAPS (UK) and Fedwire (US) 
payment systems. The TOP figures are presented with and without evening settlement.9 They include 
incoming and outgoing cross border payments through TARGET. The numbers show that TARGET 
and Fedwire are both large payment systems of the same order of magnitude. The Dutch domestic 
system is clearly smaller; only the average transaction value is relatively high. 
                                               
8
 Processing of data has been done in Java by extending graph data structures from Goodrich and Tamassia 
(2006). 
9
 Numbers including evening settlement are relevant for section ‘Net value transferred’; numbers without 
evening settlement are relevant for intraday payment behaviour discussed in section ‘Intraday dynamics’. 
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Table 1:  Key figures on daily payment characteristics Top (NL), TARGET (EU), CHAPS (UK) and 
Fedwire (US).  
 Top 
(without / with 
evening settlement) 
TARGET 
 
CHAPS  Fedwire  
Measurement Period 6/2005-5/2006 2005 2005 2005 
Participants 
Of which direct participants 
15510 
100  
10,197  
1,126 
Not available 
15 
6,819 
not available 
Transactions (x1000) 15.1 / 18.1 312 116 519 
Value (in billion €) 151 / 173 1,987 297 1,634 
Transaction value (in million 
€)  
9.9 / 9.5 11 6.4 2.6 3.1 
Source: Top (DNB), Target (ECB bluebook), CHAPS and Fedwire BIS (2007).  
TRADITIONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Now we first turn to an examination of ‘traditional’ characteristics of the payment system. The 
network measures discussed later will not render these traditional measures obsolete: they are 
complementary measures. We will first look into the intraday dynamics. Relatively stable dynamics 
are important when considering different time frames for network measures later in this study. 
Secondly we will analyse the net payment position of participants over different horizons. This should 
tell us whether there are persistent net payers or receivers and thereby indicate if directions in payment 
links between participants matter when studying network properties. We will also examine the role of 
the three biggest banks in the Netherlands. Market concentration is high and therefore the behaviour of 
the large banks is an important determinant of the overall market structure. 
Intraday dynamics 
Figure 1 displays for each business hour the average value transferred, the number of transactions 
processed and the transaction value. The first pane shows Dutch banks are willing to pay early in the 
day: value transferred peaks (€20.0 billion) during the first business hour.12 This is due to payments 
entered the day before. Numbers strongly increase to an all day high (€26.6 billion) between 16h and 
17h. Some of this activity is the result of banks that need to level their balances as a result of the 
intraday credit used or to fulfil their cash reserve requirements. These payments are usually few in 
number but relatively large in value. In the last business hour, from 17h to 18h, only transactions 
between banks are processed (no retail orders), but most banks usually do not wait until the last hour 
to close their balance of the day, and finish before 17h. Therefore, value transferred slumps in the last 
                                               
10
 The number of active participants in the measurement period amounts to 129 (or 131 with evening settlement). 
11
 All payments within a second from and to the same participant are aggregated. When every payment is treated 
separately, the average value decreases to approximately €7.5 million. In case the incoming cross border 
payments are excluded the average payment value is €6.5 million. 
12
 Against an average value transferred per hour (day) of €13.7 (151) billion. 
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hour. Closer inspection of the distributions around the means revealed they are fairly symmetrical. 
This is also the case for the distributions of the number of transactions and the transaction values. 
The second pane, showing the number of transactions, illustrates that on average about 3,500 
transactions are processed in the first hour, almost one every second. The 5% and 95% percentile 
values range from 2,800 to 4,600. The rest of the day transactions take place in smaller numbers 
(between 900 and 1,750 transactions) along a somewhat downward sloping trend against time that 
abruptly drops to very low numbers in the last hour (5% percentile ≈ 200). The average number of 
transactions per hour and per day respectively amount to 1,377 and 15,148. The distribution range is 
significant and comparable through time (between 45% to 65% of the average value for the specific 
hour). 
Finally, the third pane shows the transaction value. The average transaction value during the day 
amounts to €9.9 million but in the last two hours of business it increases strongly to respectively €22 
Figure 1: Average value transferred, number of transactions processed and 
transaction value during regular opening hours. 
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Note: the averages for a particular hour (over all of the 257 business days) are denoted by 
a dot; the bars run from the 5% low to the 95% high percentiles of the observations. The 
horizontal lines depict daily averages over regular opening hours. 
million and €71 million. The last hour, however, hardly contributes to the overall average due to the 
small number of transactions. 
Overall we observed payment characteristics do change during the day. Payment behaviour in the 
beginning and the end of the day differ most from the rest of the day. In the morning many payments 
seem to be driven by ‘good customer’ behaviour to pay early while payments during the last hour very 
likely reflect liquidity decisions mainly. We will not further distinguish between hours of the day here.  
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Further on, when determining the time development of network properties, the observed variability of 
network properties can partly be explained by the payment patterns during the day shown here.  
NET VALUE TRANSFER AND CIRCULAR FLOWS 
Introduction 
The payment system is a closed system: for the total system there is no net displacement in value. 
Structural net payment flows could still exist between (groups of) participants within the time frame of 
our data set. Conceptually, at least two independent types of structural flows can be distinguished. 
Individual participants can either have a non-zero net transfer to the rest of the system or circular flows 
may exist between participants. In the latter case, the net value transfer of each individual participant 
in the circular flow may still be zero.13 If participants become dependent on such structural flows then 
this is likely to increase sensitivity to disruptions in the system. We will show that individual 
participants generally manage their balance actively towards the rest of the system. However, when we 
focus on the three largest banks in the system and on cross-border TARGET payments at the country 
level, the payment system will prove to contain significant structural circular flows. 
Net value transfer by individual participants 
To capture possible structural behaviour between individual participants and the rest of the system, i.e. 
net value transfer, the participants are first ranked by their net value transferred during “time 
snapshots” of fixed length (respectively for one hour, one day, five days and ten days). For time 
snapshots of one day this results in 257 rankings of participants. We align these rankings at the middle 
participant of each ranking. Then, net value distributions across the rankings are determined.  
It is important to emphasize this procedure includes all participant institutions, but none of the 
TARGET country accounts (for it would be hard to see balance management for these accounts). The 
latter issue will resurface when we analyze structural circular flows between countries below. The 
current analysis should not be labelled ‘domestic’, though, since accurate determination of the net 
value transfers of individual institutions requires inclusion of all payments, including cross-border 
transactions to and from other TARGET countries. In addition, some of the largest foreign banks have 
their own participant numbers in the system.     
                                               
13
 Note that in a typical payments network net value transfer from any bank to the remaining banks is limited as 
they have to maintain an average reserve value on their account during the reserve period. In case of an 
insufficient average at the end of the period the participant will obtain funds (a loan) from another participant or 
pledge more collateral. 
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Figure 2: Net value rankings of individual participants; distributions for snapshots 
of 1 hour, 1 day, 5 and 10 days. 
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Note: Displayed in each pane are median (in red), maximum and minimum values and in 
different colour shades the 5th, 10th, 15th, 20th, 25th, 75th, 80th, 85th, 90th and 95th 
percentiles. 
Figure 2 shows the resulting distributions on the logarithmic y-axis against participants on the x-
axis.14,15 The figure points at fairly consistent net payment behaviour over time, with many smaller 
participants and a few larger participants. For the one hour period, the distribution width is clearly 
wider, decreasing for longer periods. Remarkably, the maximum and minimum net value amounts 
remain more or less constant for all four time periods (maximum between €15 billion and €18 billion; 
minimum between €-13 billion and €-22 billion).16 For the entire period of 257 days (not shown) the 
maximum and minimum values are even smaller, respectively €13 billion and €-8 billion. Total gross 
value on the other hand increases from on average €9.8 billion for the one hour period to on average 
€173 billion for the one day period (see also Table 1) and €44,575 billion over all 257 days. The 
relative net displacement of value (net value/gross value) therefore strongly decreases as the time 
period increases and is negligible over a period of one year. Overall, this leads to the conclusion that 
the system does not contain a group of significant structural net receivers or payers (cf. Furfine 
(1999)). It suggests all significant participant institutions actively manage their balance over time. 
                                               
14
 The order and total number of active participants on the x-axis will vary over snapshots. 
15
 Logarithms in this paper will have base ten. 
16
 The maximum (minimum) net value need not be at the far right (left) end of the x-axis. The maximum 
(minimum) net values across all snapshots may be linked to a snapshot that is not the largest in terms of the 
number of participants. 
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Cross-border TARGET payments (net circular flows) 
Table 2 illustrates total net cross-border payments from the Dutch TOP payment system through 
TARGET to the other TARGET countries, from June 2005 to May 2006. In aggregate, there was a 
negligible net inflow of €12.6 billion (only 0.04% of the total gross cross-border payment flows of 
€29,831 billion). On the country level, however, large net outflows take place to DE and in particular 
the UK (together €513 billion). These are largely balanced by large net inflows of similar, but opposite 
size from IT, ES, BE, EU/ECB and FR (together €472 billion). The Netherlands prove to be part of an 
international structural circular net flow between TARGET countries. For similar considerations can 
also be made for the other TARGET countries. The UK for example (also shown in the table) has a 
large net outflow of €1,758 billion to DE, FR, EU/ECB, SE, ES and DK and a large net inflow of 
€1,776 billion from BE, IT, NL and LUX. The system as a whole is a closed system.  
Rosati and Secola (2005) analyse gross cross-border large value payment flows through TARGET and 
speak of a ‘tiered market structure for liquidity’. The big countries (DE, FR and GB) are at the center 
of a core integrated market which also comprises of IT, BE and NL. The other, smaller countries form 
a sort of ‘periphery’. They also mention the basic idea that significant and stable payment patterns 
between countries could entail dependencies resulting in possible channels of contagion of liquidity 
tensions. Here we add to this analysis evidence for the existence of large circular net flows between 
TARGET countries (order of size of GDP).17               
Table 2: Cross-border net value transfers from The Netherlands and UK through TARGET to other 
TARGET countries (6/2005-5/2006). 
 
Net value transfer Net value transfer
From NL From UK
To country Value (in bn €) To country Value (in bn €)
GB 414                     DE 827                     
DE 99                       FR 619                     
IE 37                       EU 104                     
SE 4                         SE 92                       
PT 2-                         ES 62                       
DK 14-                       DK 53                       
GR 16-                       GR 29                       
AT 16-                       AT 16                       
FI 22-                       FI 5                         
LU 24-                       PT 12-                       
FR 76-                       IE 19-                       
EU 83-                       LU 69-                       
BE 97-                       NL 414-                     
ES 103-                     IT 427-                     
IT 113-                     BE 866-                     
Total 13-                       Total 0                         
 
Source: ECB  
                                               
17
 These net flows should be accompanied by opposite streams in other markets, such as the capital markets and 
markets for goods and services. 
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The three largest banks in the system (net circular flows) 
The three largest banks in the system play a dominant role and are involved in 52% of all transactions 
and 63% of total value transferred (see also section ‘Vulnerability of the network structure’). These 
figures emphasize their important role in balance management over time. Active balance management 
by each of the three banks separately is suggested, besides in actual numbers of net value transfer, by 
the presence of relatively high, negative autocorrelations (-0.44, -0.44 and -0.29 for banks A, B and C 
respectively) when the net value series of each bank is shifted over one day. Positive (negative) net 
value positions are likely to be followed by negative (positive) net value positions the next day. These 
autocorrelations do not extend beyond one day.  
Payments between the three largest banks in the system over the data period of one year reveal 
relatively large structural net flows exist between each pair of two banks. In particular, a large net flow 
of around €90 billion exist between one bank (A) and the other two banks (B and C). One circular net 
flow in the system can therefore be identified to run from bank A to banks B and C, from there to the 
rest of the system and from the rest of the system back to bank A. No circular net flow runs solely 
between the three banks. These observations add to the idea that the large banks form the central core 
of the network and are natural counterparts for the other banks in the system.  
Further work could be directed at identifying the most important circular flows in the system and at 
investigating the implications they have on the stability of the payment system. This could reveal 
possible vulnerabilities in the system. One conclusion we can already draw is that that the network is 
directed of nature. Since the current study principally wants to reveal the time development of network 
measures, we have, however, chosen to proceed by analysing the system in the next sections from the 
simplified perspective of an undirected network. 
NETWORK MEASURES 
Introduction 
The previous sections have described the payment system from a traditional perspective in terms of 
transactions processed and values transferred. This has given insight in the behaviour of individual 
participants and of the system as a whole. Now the perspective will shift towards describing the 
payment system in terms of its network properties.  
A network (or graph in mathematics) is a set of connections (links) between pairs of objects (nodes). 
Examples of real-life networks are numerous and include social networks, communications networks, 
transportation networks, biological networks, the World Wide Web, the Internet and financial 
networks. In a payments network, like the one studied here, the participants form the nodes and 
transactions establish links between the nodes. Within each time period considered, a link between two 
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nodes is created by the first transaction between them. Subsequent transactions add weight to the link 
in terms of the number of transactions processed and the additional value transferred over this link.18 
Every pair of nodes can be connected by two opposing links since the individual transactions contain a 
clear direction from payer to receiver, i.e. the network is a directed network.19 Finally, a path is an 
alternating sequence of nodes and links such that each link is incident to its predecessor and successor 
nodes. A path can be directed (along directed links) or undirected (along undirected links). 
For illustrative purposes graphical representations of some basic (undirected) network types are shown 
in Figure 3. These include a complete network, a star network, a tree network and a network with two 
disconnected components. In a complete network all nodes are connected to all other nodes by a link. 
A star network is a network in which the nodes connect to a central node called the hub. In a tree 
network all nodes are connected by exactly one path (no loops or cycles). In a network component all 
nodes are connected by at least one path. A network is connected if it consists of a single component; 
if a network is not fully connected it consists of two or more components.  
For an introduction into the theory of random networks and the treatment of real-life examples and 
extensive lists of reference material the interested reader is referred to Albert and Barabási (2002), 
Figure 3: Basic types of (undirected) networks 
Complete Network Star Network
Tree Network Disconnected Components
 
 
                                               
18
 In this paper link weights are not taken into account in determining network properties (to prevent 
subjectivity) and all links are thus considered equivalent. 
19
 The payment network is also a ‘simple network’. It contains no self-loops (payer = receiver) nor parallel or 
multiple links from one sender to one other receiver. The links of the network form a set of node pairs (not just a 
collection, see Goodrich and Tamassia (2006). For some applications this sense of direction is not essential. In 
that case, connections between nodes are formed by a single, undirected link (undirected network). This may for 
instance be the case when the establishment of a contact by a transaction is important, but not the direction of the 
transaction. 
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Dorogovtsev and Mendes (2003) and Newman (2003). Statistical descriptions of financial networks 
are scarce in literature, however, which probably relates to the confidentiality of the transaction data. 
This may be especially true for payment systems. Exceptions are Soramäki, et al. (2007), Lublóy 
(2006), and Inaoka, et al. (2004). 
Evolution of network properties 
Payment systems are dynamic networks of which the number of nodes and links can vary greatly over 
time. The actual transfer of money only creates a temporary link. As we have argued in Pröpper, et al. 
(2007), the choice of timescale for the statistical description of network properties is important and, 
for the Dutch case, the network properties of the dominant network component are representative for 
the whole payments network after about a 10 minute time period.20  
The network measures we analyse are explained in the Appendix.21 They include network size in 
nodes and links, connectivity, reciprocity, path length, eccentricity, degree, degree correlation, degree 
distribution, nearest and second nearest neighbours, and clustering. The treatment of these properties 
aims at giving more insight in the topological structure of the network. Figure 4 displays the 
development over time of the various network measures for the dominant network component. For 
each of the measures, the x-axis represents the different time periods investigated (i.e. 1, 3, 5, 10, 30 
minutes, 1, 3, 5 hours, 1, 3, 5, 15, 257 days) in minutes. The use of a logarithmic scale enables 
coverage of all time periods. It requires careful interpretation of the figures, though, to get a good 
understanding of the high rates of development for short time periods (≤ one hour) and lower rates for 
periods beyond one day. The discussion of the results is largely restricted to the relatively variable 
outcomes for the one hour time period and the relatively stable outcomes for the time period of one 
day. The former generally represent intraday network properties well, the latter network properties for 
periods from and beyond one day. 
The figure shows major developments take place mostly in the first hour of network formation. From 
one hour to one day the network grows more gradually. The size of the network measured 88±6 nodes 
on an hourly basis and 129±5 nodes on a daily basis (top left). During the whole period of 257 days 
(only) 183 nodes have been active in total. These numbers characterize a small-size network, also with 
respect to other investigated banking networks.22 In Inaoka, et al. (2004) the total number of banks 
amounted to 354, in Boss, et al. (2004) to about 900 and in Bech and Soramäki (2005) more than 5000 
banks made up the system. 
                                               
20
 After one (ten) minutes 36% (68%) of the data samples already consists of a single network component 
(Pröpper, et al. (2007)). In the case of the ten minute time frame, in the overwhelming majority of the 32% 
remaining cases there are only one or two minimally sized other components of two, three nodes. 
21
 And in for example Dorogovtsev and Mendes (2003) and Soramäki, et al. (2007). 
22
 Payments through TARGET to and from different banks in the same EU country are all recorded under the 
same country code and therefore belong to the same node. This leads to a downward bias. 
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On an hourly basis 326±76 directed links were found between the nodes (top middle). On a daily basis 
there are almost four times as many links: 1182±61. The number of links increases at a higher rate 
than the number of nodes, but the number of possible links increases with the number of nodes 
squared. Over the whole period a mere 12% of the possible number of links between nodes 
(183*182=33306) actually did become a link, to a total of 4079 links for one or more transactions.  
The fraction of actual to possible links, connectivity, gives better insight in the relative growth of 
nodes and links based on the proper, quadratic relation between them (top right). The values show that 
the network remains very sparse over all time periods. Connectivity rapidly declines from 0.16±0.12 
after one minute to a minimum of 0.04±0.01 after approximately 30 to 60 minutes, to increase 
thereafter at a lower pace to 0.07±0.00 after one day and 0.12 after 257 days. The explosion of nodes 
in the first hour suppresses connectivity, because the growth of links does not keep up with the growth 
of nodes but after one hour the situation reverses. At all times, however, the network keeps its low 
connectivity and remains far from connected. Even after 257 days 88% of all theoretically possible 
links have not been used for a single transaction. Reciprocity, the fraction of links with a link in the 
opposite direction, displays a rapid increase in the first hour to 0.44±0.12 and increases at a lower rate 
to 0.63±0.02 after one day. It means that a link in one direction implies a high probability of a link in 
the opposite direction. Payments often take place in two directions. This, however, gives no 
information on the intensity of activity in both directions. 
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Figure 4: Development of network properties over time (in minutes): nodes, links, connectivity, 
reciprocity, path length, eccentricity, degree (also max degree, max in-degree, min degree, min 
in-degree) and degree correlation (for one node and for two nodes), clustering, nearest and 
second nearest neighbours 
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Note: panes displaying nodes, links and degrees use a logarithmic y-axis. 
The average path length between two randomly selected nodes forms another way to measure the size 
of the network (middle left). This distance peaks at 2.5±0.3 nodes at the beginning of network 
formation (5 min) to decline gradually thereafter to 2.0 nodes after 257 days. The latter is of the order 
of the logarithm of the size of the network (number of nodes), a feature predicted both for the classical 
equilibrium and fat-tailed, scale-free non-equilibrium networks (Dorogovtsev and Mendes (2003)). 
The numbers indicate that every node on average connects to another node through only one 
intermediate node. The maximum distance, eccentricity (or diameter), amounts to 4.1±0.7 after 5 
minutes and declines gradually to 2.8. This means that over time the maximum number of steps 
participants have to take to reach the other participants decreases. Concentric, spherical connections 
gain strength in comparison to linear, radial connections. The network gets more structure and on a 
local level it becomes less ‘tree-like’. The results again emphasize the small size of the network (in 
‘length’ this time) and raise the question whether the intermediary node is also random in general, or 
that a core of central nodes exists through which other nodes connect. 
Node degree, the number of links connected to a node, forms an essential measure for the description 
of the direct surroundings of a node (middle right). The degree measure can be split in in-degree and 
out-degree on the basis of the number of in- and outgoing links. The concept of a degree can easily be 
extended and generalized to concentric circles of neighbouring nodes with length 1, 2, .., n (n < 
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network size). A close relationship therefore exists between degree and length of the network 
(Dorogovtsev and Mendes (2003)). Here the focus will only be on direct neighbours of length 1. From 
an initial value of 1 the network degree increases to 3.7±0.8 links per node after one hour and at a 
somewhat slower pace to 9.2±0.4 links per node after one day. It takes nearly the rest of the 256 days 
to (more than) double to 22.3 links per node. 
These outcomes deviate significantly from many theoretical models of growing networks which 
assume a fixed degree (linear growth). In these models each added node is accompanied by a fixed 
number of new links (e.g. Barabási and Albert (1999); see also discussion in Dorogovtsev and Mendes 
(2003)). The payment network clearly exhibits a form of accelerated growth, because the degree 
increases during network growth. The model of network growth would also differ from theoretical 
models due to the upper boundary in the number of participants. Growth in nodes inevitably declines 
over time, since fewer nodes can be added. The theoretical model of the payment network, including 
accelerated growth in links and a declining growth in nodes due to the limited number of participants, 
is a subject for further study.  
The time development of the maximum degree shows node degree covers a large range of values 
across the network (middle right). The maximum degree increases from a level of about 9 times the 
average degree after 1 minute, to a level of around 20 for periods between ten minutes and three hours, 
slowly declining over time to a level of 11 afterwards. Concretely, it means that after one hour the 
average node may hold 3.7±0.8 links, but the maximally linked node actually holds 79±13 links. 
Maximum out-degree surpasses maximum in-degree for periods up to a day. These maxima reflect the 
presence of one or more highly connected nodes. The presence of large differences in degree values 
also reflects large differences in the local network structure, hinting at a structure of many low-degree 
and some high-degree nodes. The actual degree distribution of nodes across the network, discussed at 
the end of this section, therefore contains indispensable information about the local structure.  
The degree correlation (centre) between in-degree and out-degree of individual nodes starts off 
negatively but becomes very strongly positive after just thirty minutes ([70%-100%]). This means that 
above (below) average in-degree has a high chance of being accompanied by above (below) average 
out-degree. Nodes that make payments to many counterparties also receive payments from many 
counterparties. The results on reciprocity already showed nodes are often counterparties in both 
directions. Degree correlations between in-degree and out-degree of two connected nodes largely 
follow the same pattern (bottom left). Degree correlations between in-degree respectively out-degree 
of two connected modes prove negative. The results on degree correlations again suggest the existence 
of a few strongly connected nodes linking to several weakly connected nodes. 
The clustering coefficient (bottom middle) measures the probability of two neighbours of a node 
sharing a link among themselves, too. Where distance measures length, clustering measures density of 
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the network structure at a local level. It gives information about the direct surroundings of the nodes. 
As expected, the development of the clustering coefficient over time confirms that formation of 
connections across neighbours takes more time to develop than sheer growth of the network. Still, the 
rate of increase in clustering is relatively high in the first hour and somewhat lower afterwards. The 
average clustering coefficient increases from 0.26±0.09 after one hour to 0.40±0.02 after one day. 
After 257 days, average clustering amounts to 0.53. It means that, on average, in half of the cases the 
neighbours of a randomly chosen node are connected among themselves, too. When comparing this to 
classical equilibrium networks, the numbers indicate relatively high correlations in the form of 
clustering exist on a local level. As in Soramäki, et al. (2007) the number of nodes with a clustering 
coefficient 0, however, is very high: 49% after one hour, 27% after one day. These can mostly be 
attributed to nodes with only one or just a few links, because the probability of at least a single link 
across neighbours increases rapidly with the number of links (more precise: the number of 
combinations of neighbours increases with the number of links squared). In any case, local density 
proves absent for a significant part of the network on a local level.  
The last pane (bottom right) displays the number of nearest neighbours z1 and second nearest 
neighbours z2 of a node. In determining z1 and z2 the direction of the links has been ignored,23 since it 
is the presence of a connection that matters here (not the direction of it). The number of nearest and 
second nearest neighbours amounts to 5.7±0.1, respectively 45±4 after one hour. These numbers 
increase to 12.5±0.5, respectively 75±3 after one day. They emphasize that the number of direct 
contacts z1 strongly increases over time and that the second line of contacts z2 through z1 (logically) is 
a multiple of the first line (the number of contacts grows strongly between the first and second line). 
Like in the case of the clustering coefficient, the results confirm that local structure takes more time to 
develop than the size of the network. 
We now turn to degree distributions. As mentioned earlier, these distributions give indispensable 
information about the relative “popularity” of participants in the system. Large banks are obvious 
examples of popular (highly connected) participants, but also the specific clearing institution which 
settles many, relatively small, customer driven payments. As such payments go to and from most 
institutions, this clearing institution will be a highly connected node many participants attach to.  
The concept of degree can easily be extended from nearest neighbours to second nearest neighbours, 
to third nearest neighbours, etc, but here the focus will be on nearest neighbours only. In Figure 5 the 
degree is plotted on the x-axis with the associated probability on the y-axis (both on a logarithmic 
scale).24 The darker the dot associated with each degree bucket, the larger the size of the firm(s) in that 
bucket. We measure firm size by total annual transaction value. 
                                               
23
 This distinguishes z1 from the degree. 
24
 Averaging has taken place over all snapshots in the dataset. 
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For one hour time snapshots the distribution already steeply declines at very low degree values; for 
one day time snapshots this rapid decline starts off from a degree value of about twenty. The largest 
observed size of a one hour (day) network amounted to 116 (130) nodes. The networks are 
characterized by a high number of nodes with relatively few connections and a small number of 
(relatively) highly connected nodes. Each of the smaller humps at the high degree end of the x-axis 
accounts for an individual node or a small group of individual nodes. These humps are basically 
distributions of individual (groups of) nodes.  
Further, in going from one hour to one day time snapshots the frequency of highly connected nodes 
increases at the expense of weakly connected nodes. During the treatment of the clustering coefficient 
and degree correlations it was already mentioned that connections across neighbours take more time to 
develop than growth of the network. The local structure becomes stronger with time. Also, the degree 
distributions for the payment network cover too few order of degree (≈ 2), to perform any fitting to a 
power–law distribution (to test whether the distribution is a scale-free, fat-tailed distribution).25 
 Figure 5: Degree distributions for time snapshots of one hour and one day, respectively 
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The shading of the dots in the graph tells us that for shorter time periods, in this case the one hour 
snapshots in the left pane, the firms with the highest degrees are not necessarily the largest firms (in 
terms of value transferred). The left pane clearly shows the importance of participants that handle 
batches of consumer payments; the value of these payments are not high but they do entail many 
connections. In comparison, the one day snapshots in the right pane show us that high degrees are 
associated with large turnover. 
                                               
25
 See §5.6 and footnote 11 of Dorogovtsev and Mendes (2003) for a critical note on the empirical ‘observations’ 
of power-law distributions. Scale-free networks have a size-dependent cut-off, which sets strong restrictions for 
such observations over 2 or 3 orders of degree. 
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VULNERABILITY OF THE NETWORK STRUCTURE 
In the introduction we noted that the study of the topological structure of the payment network (or any 
other network) is not a goal in itself, but a means for understanding the processes that make use of the 
structure. A particularly interesting topic of research is the vulnerability (or resilience) of the network 
to random or directed failures. The impact of a failure of a single node may remain confined locally or 
cause a shockwave that propagates through the system (systemic risk). The purpose here is to show 
that network theory provides tools for studying this risk. 
We analyse the impact on network properties of removal, one by one, of the most highly connected 
nodes (cf. Albert, et al. (1999)). Risks to the system may surface upon showing the importance of 
specific nodes to the topological structure. The removal procedure is equivalent to building the 
network from the raw transaction data, but leaving out all individual transactions that involve the 
specific ‘removed’ nodes. It is a static procedure with shortcomings, like for instance the absence of 
any adaptive behaviour. The topology after removing n specific nodes is always the same, but the path 
in getting there will differ upon changing the order of removal of the nodes. It means the procedure 
will not identify a unique dependence of the topology on any of the individual, removed nodes. What 
the procedure does bring to light is the dependence of the topology on removal of a limited number of 
highly connected nodes.  
Following the literature we choose one day as the timescale to measure the network properties. Figure 
6 shows the impact of the removal procedure on several selected network properties. The x-axes show 
network properties in the initial situation (‘0’) and, in going to the right, those properties after 
removing the most highly connected node (‘-1’), the second most highly connected node (‘-2’), etc., 
until ten nodes have been removed (‘-10’). The initial situation (‘0’) for all properties is the same as in 
Figure 6 (one day time period). 
The network becomes smaller and even more sparse as for instance shown by the degree values (top 
left corner) which decrease steadily, except for point ‘-7’, from 9.2 to 4.3. This results from the 
number of nodes having declined from 129 to 89 (-31%) and the number of links from 1182 to 378 (-
68%). Moreover, connectivity decreases from 0,072 to 0,049. The network loses more nodes than the 
10 deliberately removed nodes, because on average 30 neighbouring nodes with a single link will lose 
their last connection during this procedure. The seventh node (‘-7’) is a good example, since the 
degree actually increases upon removing this node. 
The removal of central, highly connected nodes increases the path lengths between the remaining 
nodes. In the removal of the seventh node this phenomenon is outweighed by the accompanying loss 
of the single link nodes and the shortest paths between them and all other nodes. Specifically, path 
length and maximum path length (top right corner), or eccentricity, increase from 2.2 to 2.5 and from 
3.3 to 4.2, respectively. 
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The outcomes for clustering and correlations both show the local structure starts to break down 
(bottom left corner). Clustering, or density of connections on a local scale, decreases from 0.40 to 
0.23. The removal of nodes two to four has an unevenly negative impact on clustering in comparison 
to the other nodes. The out-out degree correlation increases more steadily from -0.38 to -0.14 (= loss 
of correlation).26 The outcomes for nearest neighbours and second nearest neighbours confirm this 
breakdown in structure (bottom right corner). 
The impact of removing the ten most highly connected nodes on the key aggregate figures of the 
payment network is severe. Value transferred and number of transactions decline steeply to 
respectively only 6% and 12% of the initial situation (not shown here). This marks these nodes as 
essential to the core function of the payment network. This holds especially for the first 4 nodes, since 
by their removal value transferred and the number of transactions have already declined to 27% and 
30%, respectively, of the initial situation. 
Figure 6: Impact of node removal on network properties: degree, path length, 
eccentricity, clustering, out-out degree correlation, nearest and second 
nearest neighbours (z1 and z2) 
4
5
6
7
8
9
D
eg
re
e
0 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10
path length
eccentricity
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
Pa
th
 
le
n
gt
h,
 
ec
ce
n
tri
ci
ty
0 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10
clustering
out-out
-.4
-.2
0
.2
.4
Cl
u
st
er
in
g,
 
ou
t-o
u
t d
eg
re
e 
co
rr
el
at
io
n
0 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10
nearest neighbours
2nd nearest neighbours
0
20
40
60
80
N
ei
gh
bo
u
rs
0 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10
Number of removed nodes
 
 
It should be clear that random removal of ten nodes would not have caused the same impact on the 
network structure and key aggregate figures. In this sense the results are comparable to those in Albert, 
et al. (1999) in that the system is vulnerable to a directed failure (here: removal of a highly connected 
node) due to the importance of the relatively highly connected nodes in the tail of the degree 
                                               
26
 In-in degree correlation increases from -0.38 to -0.10. In-out degree correlation decreases from 0.93 to 0.59. 
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distribution. In addition, the discussed procedure of node removal convincingly shows network theory 
provides tools for analysing distortions to the network. 
THE NETWORK STRUCTURE DURING RECENT TURMOIL IN CREDIT MARKETS 
In the previous section the vulnerability of the network has been illustrated principally by a static, 
hypothetical procedure of node removal. The dependence of network properties on the most highly 
connected nodes proved to be strong. Other, more realistic events can also affect the proper 
functioning of the payment system. A prime example is a possible loss in confidence between banks 
which would reduce the liquidity of funds in the markets. If banks delay or stop making payments to 
(some) other banks, this will have its effect on the functioning of the payment system if the scale of 
such change in behaviour or the scale of banks involved is large enough.  
In 2007 problems in de US ‘sub prime’ mortgage market have caused worldwide turmoil in credit 
markets. Initially, US homeowners with risky sub prime mortgages were confronted with strongly 
rising housing costs due to rising variable mortgage rates. Their subsequent payment troubles led to 
heavy valuation losses on mortgage portfolios. These portfolios had often been securitised and sold to 
third-party investors. Previously liquid credit markets quickly dried up due to a loss of confidence 
between counterparties. Credit spreads increased strongly and central banks (ECB, FED, BoE) 
intervened to supply liquidity. In this section we investigate the impact on the functioning of the high 
value payment system. To this end we compare in Figure 7 the payment system between June and 
September 2007 (the part of the turmoil period we investigate) with the same period in 2006. This 
procedure ensures seasonal effects do not get misinterpreted. 
Figure 7 displays the functioning of the payment system by plotting a selection of previously 
discussed measures: average transaction value, degree, clustering and connectivity. If, as a result of a 
loss in confidence, participants would be more conservative in choosing their counterparties or in 
transferring large sums of money, it would show up in these measures. Some important events during 
the period of turmoil have been indicated by the vertical bars.27 It’s difficult to exactly pinpoint when 
the broad market turmoil started, but the first event (“Bear Sterns”) is a good candidate.28 This event is 
indicated in the figure by the most left vertical line. A closer view of the individual measures points to 
the importance of comparing the relevant period in 2007 with the previous year. The top left pane of 
Figure 7 shows the average transaction value of the investigated periods in 2006 and 2007. This figure 
shows that the average transaction value is higher in 2007 for most days compared to the same period 
in 2006. However there are no remarkable deviations, either positive or negative, on one of the 
                                               
27
 The vertical bars from left to right indicate market-moving news involving Bear Sterns (22-06, working day 
(wd) 16), IKB (30-07, wd 42), Goldman Sachs (07-08, wd 48), BNP (09-08, wd 50), FED and ECB liquidity 
support (09-08, wd 51), FED cuts rates (17-08, wd 56) and Bank of America (22-08, wd 59). 
28
 Earlier events before June 2007 such as the bankruptcy of a US mortgage bank did not receive the same 
worldwide attention. 
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highlighted events, nor on the other business days. The degree, shown in the top right of the figure, is 
slightly higher for the 2007 period but follows a similar trend. The clustering on the bottom left shows 
a similar result as the degree. The bottom right pane shows a higher connectivity during the turbulent 
period in 2007. In general it can be concluded that the payment activity was higher during the 
investigated turmoil period in 2007 than in the corresponding period in 2006. In both series we see 
similar periodic and non-periodic developments causing daily variability in the displayed measures. 
Unlike other markets where for example credit spreads steeply rose and activity declined, the payment 
system seems to have functioned properly and not to have been disrupted noticeable outside the 
bandwith of regular daily fluctuations. Such disruptions should clearly show up in the discussed 
measures. These outcomes are representative for the other, non-plotted measures and have been tested 
thoroughly for their validity.29  
Figure 7: Development of a selection of traditional system measures and network properties over time: 
transaction value, degree, clustering, and connectivity. 
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Note: To make the two sets of data comparable we start both series on the same day of the week. Further, we 
have dropped all days corresponding to Dutch public holidays. 
The results of this section demonstrate the usefulness of monitoring both traditional system measures 
and network properties in order to assess the functioning of the payment system. 
                                               
29
 For example by filtering out transactions below different threshold values and by filtering out all TARGET 
transactions to and from other countries. Also, other time frames shorter than 1 day have been tested.  
2007 2006
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CONCLUSIONS 
Recently, interest in the topological structure of networks has risen significantly. Application of the 
ideas of network theory to payment systems is still limited, though. This study adds to literature in 
showing the measures available to characterize such networks. The application of these measures 
illustrates the influence of the chosen time frame on the properties of the payment network (discussed 
in more detail in Pröpper, et al. (2007)) and the central role of highly connected banks in the 
functioning of the payment network.  
In this study we use data from the Dutch large value payment system TOP (part of TARGET) as TOP 
takes on a middle position in comparison to other (European) systems in terms of value transferred and 
number of transactions processed. It is a natural candidate to analyse, although naturally each country 
system will have its unique characteristics. 
We first gave a description of the network in terms of ‘traditional’ measures such as turnover and 
average payment size. An international comparison with other payment systems revealed that the 
analyzed network is midsized and relatively active. Looking at intraday developments activity proves 
high right after opening, mainly due to queued orders entered the previous day. With a brief rise in 
activity right before lunch, the all day high in value transferred takes place between four and five 
o’clock. 
Then we turned our attention to the question whether structural payment flows exist between (groups 
of) participants for two types of such flows: net value transfer and circular flows. Such dependencies 
might make the system more vulnerable to failures and would emphasize the need to include 
information on the direction of payments in the description of network properties. We examined this 
issue both for the full sample, as well as for the three largest banks in the sample.  
The distributions of net value rankings of individual participants remain remarkably similar for 
different time periods. In addition, the relative net displacement of value (net value/gross value) of 
individual participants strongly decreases as the time period increases. These findings led us to 
conclude that the system does not contain a group of significant structural net receivers or payers 
among the participant institutions. For periods of one day and beyond a dominant group of active 
participants exists that hardly transfers any net funds relative to gross value transferred. The outcomes 
suggest all significant participant institutions actively manage their balance over time.  
By focusing on the three largest banks in the system we could identify the existence of an important 
structural, net circular flow in the payment system. It means the payment system is a directed network. 
In addition, a short analysis of total net cross-border payments through TARGET revealed The 
Netherlands are part of an international structural circular net flow (order of size of GDP). The 
observations of the presence of large circular net flows between TARGET countries add to the idea of 
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Rosati and Secola (2005) that significant and stable payment patterns between countries could entail 
dependencies resulting in possible channels of contagion of liquidity tensions. Further work could aim 
at identifying the most important, circular flows in the (international) system and at investigating the 
implications of structural flows on the stability of the payment system. Since the current study 
principally wants to reveal the time development of network measures, we have, however, chosen to 
proceed by analysing the system from the simplified perspective of an undirected network.  
Then we proceeded with a presentation of the time development of several important network 
measures. As we have argued in Pröpper, et al. (2007), time is crucial in analysing networks with short 
lived links, like payment networks. The outcomes have made explicit to what extent fast development 
takes place in the early phase of network formation of about one hour and slower development 
afterwards. The payment network proves to be small (in nodes and links), compact (in path length and 
eccentricity) and sparse (in connectivity) for all time periods. Measurements of degree and degree 
correlations, clustering, and the number of nearest and second nearest neighbours describe the 
development of network structure at a local level. As expected, development of network structure 
takes more time than growth of the network in terms of size. The actual degree distribution contains 
indispensable information on the local structure. It proves that the network is characterized by a high 
number of nodes with relatively few connections and a low number of highly connected nodes. Of 
particular importance is the observation that the average degree increases during growth of the 
network. This contrasts with many theoretical models that assume node degree remains fixed. Further 
work could therefore be directed at modelling the payment network using a type of accelerated 
network growth in links.  
Finally, we showed that the payment system is vulnerable to a directed failure and that recent market 
turmoil has not materially affected the network structure. The vulnerability of the network was tested 
by removing, one by one, the ten most highly connected nodes. Node removal had a strong impact on 
value transferred, number of transactions and network properties like degree, path length and 
eccentricity, clustering and degree correlation, and nearest and second nearest neighbours. These 
outcomes emphasized the central role the most highly connected banks, especially the top 4 of these, 
play in the payment system: they are essential to the core function of the payment network. We also 
investigated whether the recent ‘subprime’ turmoil in credit markets has led to changes in the structure 
of the payment network by comparing recent time-series of network measures with the same period a 
year earlier. We concluded that it has not materially affected the network structure of the payment 
system during the investigated period. Since severe disruptions in the payment system would 
inevitably show up in the discussed measures, it is useful to monitor for changes in traditional system 
measures and in network properties. A comparison with developments in previous years may ensure 
seasonal effects do not get misinterpreted. 
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The current study intends to show how various measures can be used in analysing payment networks. 
It is also an exploratory study: two clear directions for further research are analysing, first, the 
importance of link weights and, second, the role of collateral and available liquidity in absorbing 
shocks. Ultimately, knowledge of the functioning of the payment network is aimed at gaining a better 
understanding of the means to preserve its stability. 
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APPENDIX NETWORK PROPERTIES30  
Size 
The most basic network properties are the number of nodes nodes (n) and links (l). The former is often 
referred to as the size of the system. The relative number of links l to the possible number of links 
determines the network connectivity (c). It represents the probability of two nodes sharing a link. For a 
directed network, with links between nodes in two directions, connectivity is given by 
( )( )1/ −⋅= nnlc . For a connected network (i.e. without disconnected components) 1−≥ nl . In the 
special circumstance 1−= nl  the network is a so called tree network with minimal connectivity 
nc /1= . Connectivity reaches it maximum value 1=c  for a completely connected network. All 
possible links have then been realized. Reciprocity, finally, is the fraction of links with a link in the 
opposite direction (range from 0 to 1). 
Path length 
A path is an alternating sequence of connected nodes and links that starts and terminates at a node. If 
all links represent unit length, path length lij between nodes i and j is the length of the shortest path 
between the nodes. The average path length li for node i is the average distance to all other nodes. 
Although a directed network in principle consists of directed paths that are being traversed in the 
direction of the links, direction is not taken into account here. The path represents a connected 
sequence of contacts in the form of transactions rather than a sequence of directed flows of payments. 
Link weights in terms of value transferred may vary strongly over one path so that direction of flow, 
without explicitly taking into account link weights, not necessarily contains very valuable information. 
Average network length lavg is the average of all path lengths li. It determines the average undirected 
shortest path. Network eccentricity (e) is defined as the largest of the observed path lengths: 
( )jiji le ,,max= .  
Degree 
The number of links between one node i and other nodes determines the node degree (ki). In a directed 
network these connections consist of incoming and outgoing links, which respectively determine the 
in-degree (kin,i), the out-degree (kout,i), and node degree (ki) by ioutiini kkk ,, += . Every link contributes 
exactly one unit to both the out-degree of the node at which it originates and to the in-degree of the 
node at which it terminates. The average degree (kavg) of a network is the relative number of all links 
to all nodes: ∑∑∑ ====
i
iout
i
iin
i
iavg knknknnlk ,, /1/12/1/ .  
                                               
30
 Based on Dorogovtsev and Mendes (2003) and Soramäki, et al. (2007). 
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The maximum in-degree ( )iiniin kk ,max, max= , maximum out-degree ( )ioutiout kk ,max, max=  and 
maximum degree ( ) ( )ioutiiniii kkkk ,,max maxmax +==  determine the maximum degree values and 
the maximum deviations (to the upside) from the respective average degree values. More informative 
and more elaborate to determine are the degree distributions P(ki), P(kin,i) and P(kout,i) for a specific 
node i. Summation over all nodes i and taking averages results in the total degree distributions P(k), 
P(kin) and P(kout). Two examples of degree distributions are respectively a Poisson distribution and a 
power-law distribution. The former results when a fixed number of nodes is randomly connected on 
the basis of the fixed network degree kavg. Larger networks asymptotically follow the Poisson 
distribution 
!
)(
k
ke
kP
k
avg
kavg
⋅
=
−
(classical equilibrium network). In practice, however, many networks 
have (relatively recently) been found to follow a power-law distribution γ−∝ kkP )( . These non-
equilibrium networks are characterized by fat-tails which mark the relatively high frequency of highly 
connected nodes in comparison to classical equilibrium networks. They originate from growing 
networks in which new nodes (linearly) preferentially attach to other nodes. They have no natural 
scale and are called scale-free networks. In recent years it has been demonstrated that many social, 
informational, technological and biological networks have fat-tailed, scale-free degree distributions 
(see for instance Amaral, et al. (2000), Newman (2003), and Dorogovtsev and Mendes (2003)).  
Degree correlations 
Degree correlations between neighbouring nodes provide additional information on the network 
structure. In an uncorrelated network the degree of one node is independent of its neighbouring nodes. 
Degree correlations therefore provide information on whether nodes are generally connected to nodes 
with comparable degree, to nodes of different degree, or if there is no relation at all. Classical random 
networks have no correlations. Fat-tailed, scale-free networks on the other hand may exhibit strong 
correlations. 
Several measures exist for degree correlations. For example:  
• Between kin and kout for individual nodes 
• Between kin and kout, kin and kin, or kout and kout for two nodes 
Clustering coefficient 
Another concept to describe the correlation between nodes is the clustering coefficient (Ci), which 
gives the probability that two neighbours of a node share an undirected link among themselves. It 
marks the density of connections in the direct neighbourhood of a node (cliquishness). The clustering 
coefficient is determined by the number of actual undirected links between nearest neighbours (lnn,i) of 
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a node i as a fraction of the number of possible undirected links: ( )1
2
,
−⋅
=
ii
inn
i kk
l
C . The average 
clustering coefficient (Cavg) over all nodes determines the network clustering. The meaning of the 
coefficient becomes particularly clear in a social context where it is the extent of the mutual 
acquaintance of friends. The clustering coefficient ranges from 0 for a tree network to 1 for a 
completely connected network. The classical random network locally has a tree-like structure (loops 
cease to exist in the infinite network). Fat-tailed, scale-free networks may exhibit strong clustering. 
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